Difference between revisions of "Course:Law3020/2014WT1/Group I/System Of Rights"
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Ronald Dworkin has been the most prolific and influential writer since H.L.A. Hart on issues in the philosophy of law. He is currently the dominant figure in jurisprudence in Canada, and is a strong critic of legal positivist theory. | Ronald Dworkin has been the most prolific and influential writer since H.L.A. Hart on issues in the philosophy of law. He is currently the dominant figure in jurisprudence in Canada, and is a strong critic of legal positivist theory. | ||
| − | + | ====Law as a System of Rights==== | |
| − | Ronald Dworkin rejects the model of law as a system of rules. According to Dworkin, law is not merely a system of rules but also of principles. | + | Ronald Dworkin rejects the model of law as a system of rules. According to Dworkin, law is not merely a system of rules but also of principles, primarily of justice and fairness. Since these principles are a part of the law, Dworkin denies that there are gaps in the law and Hart's suggestion that judges should have to use discretion when deciding hard cases. Dworkin further rejects the positivists claim that neither parties have a legal right to win since principles always create a right answer to every legal question. Dworkin develops a theory of adjudication in which principles have their right place. He calls this theory "law as integrity". |
==Application of the E. (Mrs.) v. Eve== | ==Application of the E. (Mrs.) v. Eve== | ||
Revision as of 19:59, 4 March 2014
Background & Theory
Ronald Dworkin has been the most prolific and influential writer since H.L.A. Hart on issues in the philosophy of law. He is currently the dominant figure in jurisprudence in Canada, and is a strong critic of legal positivist theory.
Law as a System of Rights
Ronald Dworkin rejects the model of law as a system of rules. According to Dworkin, law is not merely a system of rules but also of principles, primarily of justice and fairness. Since these principles are a part of the law, Dworkin denies that there are gaps in the law and Hart's suggestion that judges should have to use discretion when deciding hard cases. Dworkin further rejects the positivists claim that neither parties have a legal right to win since principles always create a right answer to every legal question. Dworkin develops a theory of adjudication in which principles have their right place. He calls this theory "law as integrity".