Course:Law3020/2014WT1/Group E/System Of Rights

= Law as a System of Rights =

Ronald Dworkin
Ronald Dworkin was an American legal philosopher who was a professor at New York University, University College London, Yale, and Oxford University. Being the second most cited legal author in the twentieth century, Dworkin's legacy is his theory of law as both rule and principles, and his rights thesis.



Rejection of Positivist Tenets
As a basis for his system of law as rights, Dworkin rejects the three following (positivist) propositions:


 * Law is a set of rules identified as such (legal rules) with reference to a master rule (the “rule of recognition” eg) apart from content (master rule disconnected from content- the separation thesis)
 * Where no legal rule applies, judges exercise discretion
 * Legal rights and obligations are the product of legal rules, with no a priori or independent existence apart from those rules

Dworkin's assertion is that law contains principles in addition to rules, and that these principles subvert the positivist approach.

Legal Rules & Principles
According to Dworkin, legal rules have an a priori existence based in principles of justice, fairness, and morality. Contrary to the positivist ideal of a universal rule which is the ultimate determinant of binding law, Dworkin contends that legal rules are embedded in more extensive legal principles. He distinguishes rules from principles by asserting that rules are ever-changing, whereas principles stagnantly provide a foundation of these rules and the legal system as a whole. In a case where there is no applicable rule, there will still be applicable principles which are legally binding due to their foundational nature.

Dworkin's Rights Thesis
The fundamental point of Dworkin's right thesis is that judicial decisions enforce existing political rights. Political decisions are justified by using principles to demonstrate that the decision protects an individual or group right.

= Application to K.L.B. v. B.C =

Reviewing the jurisprudence, and considering the policy issues involved, I conclude that in determining whether an employer is vicariously liable for an employee’s unauthorized, intentional wrong in cases where precedent is inconclusive, courts should be guided by the following principles:


 * 1) They should openly confront the question of whether liability should lie against the employer, rather than obscuring the decision beneath semantic discussions of “scope of employment” and “mode of conduct”.
 * 2) The fundamental question is whether the wrongful act is sufficiently related to conduct authorized by the employer to justify the imposition of vicarious liability.  Vicarious liability is generally appropriate where there is a significant connection between the creation or enhancement of a risk and the wrong that accrues therefrom, even if unrelated to the employer’s desires.  Where this is so, vicarious liability will serve the policy considerations of provision of an adequate and just remedy and deterrence.  Incidental connections to the employment enterprise, like time and place (without more), will not suffice.  Once engaged in a particular business, it is fair that an employer be made to pay the generally foreseeable costs of that business.  In contrast, to impose liability for costs unrelated to the risk would effectively make the employer an involuntary insurer.
 * 3) In determining the sufficiency of the connection between the employer’s creation or enhancement of the risk and the wrong complained of, subsidiary factors may be considered.  These may vary with the nature of the case.  When related to intentional torts, the relevant factors may include, but are not limited to, the following:
 * (a) The opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his or her power;
 * (b) The extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the employer’s aims (and hence be more likely to have been committed by the employee);
 * (c) The extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction, confrontation or intimacy inherent in the employer’s enterprise;
 * (d) The extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to the victim
 * (e) The vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful exercise of the employee’s power.